The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of the Judicial Process? by Kunkler, Mark
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 6
12-15-1983
The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse
of the Judicial Process?
Mark Kunkler
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Litigation Commons,
Products Liability Commons, Remedies Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Kunkler The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of the Judicial Process?, 11 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1984)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/6
The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of
the Judicial Process?
Federal bankruptcy law offers a refuge to the honest debtor who is un-
able to pay his credito's when his debts are due. Here, the twin aims of
bankruptcy law, to give the debtor a fresh start and to provide roughly
equal treatment for his! creditors, are laudably accomplished. But what
policies support the use of federal bankruptcy law when the "debtor" is in
fact solvent and apparently seeks refuge only to escape liability for the
products it manufactures? This comment examines the recent filing of the
Manville Corporation for Chapter 11 protection under bankruptcy law
with this question in mind.
I. INTRODUCTION
The manufacturer of a widely marketed product often faces
risks which are inherent in a free market economic system. Com-
petition in the marketplace ideally leads to the advancement and
prosperity of the manufacturer who markets the better product;
less successful manufacturers, those who supply a product of
lesser quality or usefulness, suffer the loss of profits and prestige.
The benefits of such a competitive economy ultimately accrue to
the public in the form of lower prices for goods and services, di-
verse employment opportunities, and a variety of products avail-
able for consumption.
On the other hand, competition in the marketplace, however
beneficial in the larger picture, often induces a manufacturer in
search of profits to take risks that may ultimately harm society
and lead to the manufacturer's own economic collapse. This may
occur when the manufacturer markets a defective product know-
ingly or in reckless disregard of the rights of others. While a man-
ufacturer of a defective product may be strictly liable without
regard to intent, he may be subject to punitive damages if it is de-
termined that his conduct warrants punishment.
It is at this point that society and the courts face a dilemma: If
the purposes of punitive damages are to punish the offender and
to deter similar conduct by him and other offenders in the future,
how are punitive damages to be administered so as to accomplish
these purposes while avoiding the bankruptcy of an entity that
may have provided much societal good in the past? This question
was raised initially in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,1
which involved an award of punitive damages against the manu-
facturer of a widely marketed drug. Several hundred suits had
been filed against Richardson-Merrell, Inc. throughout the United
States. The court expressed its concern that punitive awards
combined with large compensatory awards could "end the busi-
ness life of a concern that has wrought much good in the past and
might otherwise have continued to do so in the future, with many
innocent stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for
a single management sin."2
The primary issue when imposing punitive damages in mass lit-
igation is how much punishment and deterrence is enough? Rec-
ognizing that it is nearly impossible to judicially limit the number
of plaintiffs that would be permitted to seek punitive damages,
the court in Roginsky stated: "[w] e have the gravest difficulty in
perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity
of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to
avoid overkill." 3
The assessment of punitive damages in a products liability suit,
and the subsequent threat of bankruptcy as a result, have been
given only cursory treatment by the courts.4 Where it has been
considered, courts and commentators have generally disparaged
any danger of bankruptcy flowing from an award of punitive dam-
ages. Such fears were generally dismissed as "more theoretical
than real."5
1. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
2. Id. at 841.
3. Id. at 839. The court concluded that it was nearly impossible to judicially
limit the number of plaintiffs that could seek punitive damages and cut off such
recovery by subsequent plaintiffs. Id. at 839-40 n.11. "Neither does it seem either
fair or practicable to limit punitive recoveries to an indeterminate number of first-
comers, leaving it to some unascertained court to cry 'Hold, enough,' in the hope
that others would follow." Id. at 839-40.
4. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376-77
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1978);
State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1980); deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MXcH. L. REV. 1257, 1260-61 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Owen]. For a discussion of the MER/29 litigation in particular, see Rhe-
ingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968).
5. Owen, supra note 4, at 1324-25. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, 548 F.
Supp. 357, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (The court, faced with facts and issues sub-
stantially similar to those facing the Second Circuit in Roginsky, "respectfully"
differed from the court's holding, and awarded punitive damages. The court in
Toole found that the "intentional, wilful and reckless conduct" of Richardson-
Merrell justified sending the issue of punitive damages to the jury. The Toole
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The theory became reality on August 26, 1982, when the
Manville Corporation filed for reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The filing followed a case which
awarded, for the first time, punitive damages against the Manville
Corporation. Almost immediately, the legal profession and mem-
bers of Congress decried the filing as an unwarranted escape
from liability for the corporation's "outrageous conduct" and an
abuse by Manville of the judicial process.
Admittedly, the Manville Corporation's filing for reorganization
and relief under federal bankruptcy law raises serious questions:
Can punitive damages in mass products liability litigation be ad-
ministered so as to avoid "overkill"? Is the filing of a solvent
debtor an abuse of judicial process? Should the Manville Corpo-
ration rightly escape punishment in the form of punitive damages
by filing for Chapter 11 reorganization? Absent a national com-
pensation scheme for asbestos victims, should Congress, the
courts or industry provide relief to injured workers? These ques-
tions deserve exploration. This comment seeks to explore these
issues and answer them where possible.
II. ASBESTOS AND A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER
A. Exposure to Asbestos
Asbestos is a fibrous mineral which possesses attributes that
are readily adaptable to modern technological needs. The fibers
are strong, flexible, heat resistant, and chemical resistant.6 These
characteristics render asbestos ideal for use as insulation. Of the
one million tons of asbestos products consumed annually in the
United States,7 approximately 77 percent is used in construction. 8
The remainder is consumed by non-construction industries in
such products as textiles, brake linings, clutch facings, papers,
court thus implicitly rejected the Roginsky court's fears of resulting bankruptcy.
Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17 n.3.); State ex rel. Younger
v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268, 1270-72 (1980).
6. "Asbestos" is a generic term for a number of mineral silicates. The major
minerals are chrysotile (mined predominantly in Canada, the Soviet Union and
Zimbabwe), amosite (mined only in South Africa), anthophyllite (found princi-
pally in Finland and Kenya), tremolite (mined in the United States) and actinolite
(rare). 40 Fed. Reg. 47,652 (1975).
7. Id. at 47,653 (citing BUREAU OF MINES, MINERALS YEARBOOK, 1973).
8. Id. Of the tonnage used in construction, 92 percent was "bonded," i.e.,
"locked" in such products as asbestos cements, floor tiles, and roofing felts and
shingles. Id.
paints, plastics, roof coatings, floor tiles, and miscellaneous other
products.
The use of asbestos has been widespread; approximately 30 mil-
lion tons are presently in place in the United States.9 During
World War II and thereafter, the government required the use of
asbestos insulation on navy ships. Asbestos has been sprayed
into walls and ceilings, and applied to structural components such
as steel beams, furnaces and pipes. From World War II until 1973,
asbestos-containing materials were used extensively in the con-
struction of both public and private schools.10 According to Don
Clay, the director of the Office of Toxic Substances of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA):
Based on data submitted voluntarily by school districts, EPA has esti-
mated that friable[11] asbestos-containing materials are present in ap-
proximately 8,600 public schools. An estimated 3 million students and
250,000 teachers and staff regularly use these schools; over the lifetime of
the buildings, some 15 million students and employees will use them.12
Between 1940 and 1980, more than thirteen million men and wo-
men were exposed to asbestos in their work environment.' 3 Pres-
ently, there are approximately nine million men and women who
work with asbestos and are likely to suffer serious asbestos-in-
duced diseases in the future.14 Exposure to asbestos has recently
been shown to cause asbestosis,15 lung cancer,16 malignancy of
9. Hearings on the Hazards of Asbestos Exposure before the Subcomm. of
Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982) (statement of Irving J. Selikoff, M.D.) [here-
inafter cited as Asbestos Hearings.]
10. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 106. (statement of Don Clay, Director
of the Office of Toxic Substances of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)).
11. A substance is "friable" if it can be crumbled in the hand and reduced to a
powder, thereby releasing the asbestos fibers. "Asbestos fibers are extremely du-
rable, and their size and shape permit them to remain airborne for [a] long period
of time. When these fibers do settle, any number of activities, including dusting,
sweeping, vacuuming, repair activities, and every ordinary movement, cause
resuspension." Id. at 107.
12. Id. Mr. Clay also reported that 1,800 nonpublic schools were also faced
with friable asebestos hazards. Id.
13. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Irving J. Selikoff, M.D.).
14. Id.
15. Asbestosis (pulmonary fibrosis) is a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs
and is evidenced by shortness of breath, restrictive pulmonary function, clubbing
of the fingers, or "rales" (dry, crackling sounds in the lungs). Goodman, Radiology
of Asbestos Disease, 249 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 644 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Good-
man]. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,652, 47,653 (1975) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (pro-
posed Oct. 9, 1975)). The disease is progressive; the asbestos particles trapped in
the lung continue their biological action. "In its severe forms, death results from
the inability of the body to obtain requisite oxygen or from the heart's failure to
pump blood through the scarred lungs." 40 Fed. Reg. at 47,653. See also 4 A. GRAY,
ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 205C.50, 205C.60 (3d ed. 1981) (hereinafter
cited as GRAY).
16. Lung cancer is 70 times more likely to develop in a smoking asbestos
worker than a nonsmoking asbestos worker. Goodman, supra note 15, at 645. This
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the interior of the lung,17 mesothelioma-a rapidly spreading tu-
mor of the lining of the chest cavity or the lining of the abdo-
men,18 and cancer of the stomach, colon and rectum.'9
Currently, it is estimated that 8,500 asbestos-related cancer
deaths are occurring each year.20 This number is expected to rise
to 10,000 annual deaths by the year 1990.21 Altogether, more than
1.6 million workers are expected to die of an asbestos-related
disease.22
While continuous, heavy exposure to asbestos is necessary to
induce asbestosis, 23 a single or mild exposure may be sufficient to
cause mesothelioma. 24 There are many reported cases of family
members of asbestos workers developing asbestos-related dis-
eases even though they were not directly exposed to asbestos
processing. It is no exaggeration to call the present asbestos cri-
sis a "public health disaster."25
is because asbestos and cigarette smoke are "cocarcinogens." See GRAY, supra
note 15, at 205C.71.
17. This is bronchogenic carcinoma. 40 Fed. Reg. at 47,653.
18. Mesothelioma is "three to five times more frequent in asbestos workers
than in nonasbestos workers." Goodman, supra note 15, at 645. The tumor is in-
curable by modem methods, and death usually occurs within one year of diagno-
sis. 40 Fed. Reg. at 47,653. See GRAY, supra note 15, at 205C.72.
19. 40 Fed. Reg. at 47,653. There is a latency period between initial exposure
and development of asbestos-related diseases. This period may range from twenty
to forty years. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Irving J. Se-
likoff, M.D.). "Disease being seen now can be traced back to inhalation of dust in
the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's. The exposures of the '70's will not bear their bitter
fruit until 1990, the year 2000 or well into the twenty-first century." Id. See Se-
likoff & Hammond, Asbestos-Associated Disease in the United States Shipyards, 28
CA-A CANCER J. FOR CLiN. 37 (1978); See also Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The
Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55, 63 (1978).
20. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 26 (statement by William J. Nicholson,
M.D., Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, N.Y.). This estimate was conceded to be on
the low side in that no account was taken of asbestos-related diseases contracted
outside the workplace. Id. Note that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, Joseph A. Califano, stated in 1978 that 67,000 people will die from asbestos-
induced cancer in the next thirty to thirty-five years. Comment, supra note 19, at
56 (citing the Hartford Courant, Sept. 12, 1978, at 1, cols. 7-8).
21. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 26 (statement of William J. Nicholson,
M.D.).
22. See 127 CONG. REC. § 10033 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Hart).
23. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Irving J. Selikoff, M.D.).
24. Goodman, supra note 15, at 645. See Selikoff & Hammond, supra note 19, at
87. See also Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 4, 7 (statement of Irving J. Selikoff,
M.D.).
25. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Irving J. Selikoff, M.D.).
Dr. Selikoff borrowed the term from a British colleague, Dr. Doll of Oxford. Id.
B. Health Hazard
The detrimental effects of asbestos have been observed since
ancient times.26 However, it was not until the early 1900's that the
scientific and medical professions began to take serious note of
health hazards associated with asbestos.27 Much of the early re-
search was done in Great Britain;28 as a result, in the 1930's, Great
Britain established regulations concerning the use of asbestos. 29
Research in the United States began in the late 1920's. In 1929,
the asbestos industry, concerned with rising workman's compen-
sation claims attributed to asbestos, 30 hired the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company to conduct a study on the effects of asbestos
on the health of asbestos workers. 31 The study was completed in
1931, but was not published until 1935.32 The results showed that
prolonged exposure to asbestos dust caused asbestosis. 33 As a re-
sult of these early British and American studies, the serious
hazards of asbestos inhalation became universally recognized.34
In 1965, a report by Dr. Selikoff of the Mt. Sinai School of
Medicine was published showing examination results in a study
of 1,522 insulation workers.35 The results showed that 48.5% of all
the workers had pulmonary asbestosis, and of those exposed to
26. D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB 84 (1978). Pliny the Elder, of first-century
Rome, observed that slaves who used to mine asbestos, suffered from lung disease
and had fashioned a "make shift respirator" to protect themselves as they worked.
See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.3 (5th Cir.
1973).
27. BERMAN, supra note 26, at 84-85. The first medical report of a workman's
death caused by asbestos was issued in 1906 by Montague Murray, a British physi-
cian. Id. at n.29.
28. See Cooke, Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust, 2
BRIT. MED. J., 147 (1924); Cooke, Pulmonary Asbestosis, 2 BRIT. MED. J., 1024 (1927).
29. Sweeney, The Asbestos Time Bomb, 14 TRLAIL 17 (Oct. 1978).
30. The first claim for an asbestos related disability was filed in 1927. Lanza,
Asbestosis, 106 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 369 (1936).
31. BERMAN, supra note 26, at 85. The employees studied were mainly employ-
ees of the Johns-Manville Company. Id. The study involved employees at five
plants and mines in the United States and Canada, and was conducted by Dr.
Anthony J. Lanza. Sweeney, supra note 29, at 17.
32. BERMAN, supra note 26, at 85.
33. Sweeney, supra note 29, at 17. The study showed that 67 of the 126 people
examined had pulmonary fibrosis; i.e, asbestosis. BERMAN, supra note 26, at 85.
See generally, Kotelchuk, Your Job or Your Life, HEALTH-PAc. BULL. (March 1973).
See also Dreesen, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Texrtile Industry, PUB.
HEALTH BuLL. No. 241 (1938).
34. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083 and accompanying footnote. Dr. Selikoff recently
told a congressional subcommittee: "Following the first report of death due to as-
bestos inhalation in 1924, a series of surveys in this country and Great Britain
from 1929 to 1931 showed that lung scarring-asbestosis--could be a common out-
come of working with the mineral." Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (state-
ment of Irving J. Selikoff, M.D.).
35. Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Indus-
trial Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. OF N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 139 (1965).
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asbestos for forty years or more, 94.2% had asbestosis. 36
Dr. Selikoff's findings were instrumental in the passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.37 The Act empow-
ered the Secretary of Labor to establish standards of permissible
exposure to airborne asbestos. Currently, the standard provides
that no employee may be exposed to more than two fibers longer
than 5 micrometers per cubic centimeter of air.38 Compliance
with this standard is to be met by "engineering controls;" i.e., ven-
tilation, isolation, dust collection, and by "work practices" such as
"wet" handling of asbestos, use of respirators, and laundering. 39
Despite a growing body of evidence showing the detrimental ef-
fects of asbestos on the health of the public,40 the industry contin-
ued to challenge the scientific findings. 4 1 The scientific
community, the government, and the courts have not given great
weight to the industry's protestations. The evidence shows that
the industry "continually failed to warn users of hazards associ-
ated with the inhalation of asbestos fibers, despite overwhelming
knowledge of those hazards by high ranking corporate offi-
cials . ,,42 This failure to warn has been held to be in reckless
36. Id. at 147. This evidence is reprinted in Borel, 493 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (5th
Cir. 1973). See generally SELIKOFF & LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE (1978).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-655 (1970), 84 Stat. 1590 [hereinafter cited as "OSHA"]. See
BERMAN, supra note 26, at 86.
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(b) (2) (1982). The original OSHA standard was in-
cluded in the initial promulgation of regulations published on May 29, 1971 (36
Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1971)) pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). That standard lim-
ited exposure to 2 million particles per cubic foot of air. See Comment, supra note
19, at 66.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(c) (1982). Growing awareness of the health hazards of
asbestos is reflected in the regulation of asbestos exposure by other adminstrative
agencies. These include: The EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 61.20 (1982); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 16 C.F.R. § 1500.17(7) (1982) (banning general-use garments con-
taining asbestos); and The Mining Enforcement & Safety Admin., 29 C.F.R. §§ 55.5-
l(b) (1981).
40. "By 1960, sixty-three scientific papers on the problem of asbestos exposure
and health had been published in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada."
BERMAN, supra note 26, at 85, Fifty-two papers were independently sponsored; the
remaining eleven were sponsored by the asbestos industry. The eleven papers
sponsored by the industry, interestingly enough, rejected the connection between
asbestos and lung cancer. Id.
41. The challenges from the industry came as late as 1978. See AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRIAL HEALTH COUNCIL, A REPLY To: "ESTIMATES OF THE FRACTION OF CANCER
IN THE UNITED STATES ATTRIBUTABLE TO OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS" (1978); Com-
ment, supra note 19, at 64.
42. Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, 548 F. Supp. at 375. But see In re Related Asbes-
tos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Illustrative of the personal tragedy
suffered by asbestos workers is the story of Ted Kowalski:
disregard of the rights of others, and has been held to be conduct
sufficiently "outrageous" so as to warrant punitive damages.
III. BACKGROUND: PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MASS LITIGATION
INVOLVING PRODUCTS MANUFACTURERS: DETERRENT OR
DESTROYER?
A. In General
The primary purposes of punitive damages are to punish the of-
fending party and to deter such acts by him and other offenders
in the future. To warrant punitive damages, the defendant's con-
duct must be "outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive
or his reckless indifference to the rights of others."4 3 The trier of
I went to work in a department adjacent to the shipping department,
which was the finishing department. The rest of my days at Johns-
Manville were in the finishing department. I worked on the machines cut-
ting asbestos, bagging asbestos, crushing asbestos, eating with asbestos,
speaking to my friends with asbestos, and everything we did in our life in
that plant was asbestos. As the sun would shine through the skylight, all
you could see was millions of particles that would glitter. It would just
glitter in the skylight...We would pick out asbestos from our coffee, the
larger pieces that fell in; pieces that fell in our sandwiches that we did not
know or whatever fell into the coffee we drank.
Not only did they make us ill. According to the testimony, public
records, that industry knew of the ills caused by asbestos. They used us
as carriers. You could say we were their prostitutes. We took their ills
home to our families.
My wife is 54 years old. Never worked a day in the plant, who looked to
some day in the near future after raising her children that she too could
enjoy life, is also a victim of asbestosis. My son at the age of 31 is also a
victim...I know the hardship and ills caused by asbestosis. I lived with it.
We paid our own medical bills because of someone else's greed that
placed profit over human life. There was no excuse.
Asbestos Hearings, supra note 9, at 58 (statement of Ted Kowalski).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). This section provides:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous con-
duct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can prop-
erly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of
the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause
and the wealth of the defendant.
Id. The doctrine of punitive damages has been widely accepted in the United
States. All but five states allow some measure of recovery for punitive damages.
The states not allowing such recovery are Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska and Washington. GHIARDI AND KIRCHER, PuNrrIvE DAMAGES, LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 4.07-4.12 (1981). In addition to these five states, four others, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Michigan and New Hampshire, apply "punitive damages" in the na-
ture of compensatory damages. Id. at §§ 4.02-4.06. The majority of the states that
allow punitive damages cite both punishment and deterrence as justification; in
Alaska, Georgia (which has a "compensatory" scheme), Idaho, Maine, Oregon,
Rhode Island and Utah, "deterrence" is the only supporting basis for a punitive
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fact, whether judge or jury, in its discretion, may consider the act
itself, the motives of the defendant, the relations between the par-
ties, the harm done, and the wealth of the defendant 44 when as-
sessing the amount of punitive damages.
While the doctrine of punitive damages has been widely ac-
cepted, it is still a subject of controversy. In 1851, the Supreme
Court in Day v. Woodworth, 45 admitted that the doctrine was sub-
ject to question but ruled that "if repeated judicial decisions for
more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of
what the law is, the question will not admit of argument." 46 In
the years since Day, the controversy has not abated.47 The doc-
trine has suffered repeated attacks on constitutional grounds in-
cluding challenges based upon double jeopardy, 48 due process, 4 9
award, and in one state, Delaware, "punishment" is the sole basis. Id. at §§ 4.14-
4.16.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1979). The wealth of
the defendant is relevant in assessing an amount that will actually "punish" the
defendant for his conduct.
45. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
46. Id. at 371.
47. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891); Car-
sey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline,
11 FORUM 57 (1975); DuFFY, PuNrrIvE DAMAGES: A DOCTRINE WHICH SHOuLD BE
ABOLISHED, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTrrUTE: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES 4 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by
Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L REV. 1158 (1966).
48. The fifth amendment. of the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"...nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb..." Punitive damages, it is contended, subjects a person to double
jeopardy because he is punished for a civil offense when he may also be subject to
criminal sanctions for the same offense. This argument has been rejected by
many courts in the United States. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 42
Colo. App. 497, 596 P.2d 413 (1979). Some jurisdictions which reject the argument
read the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy to apply solely to criminal
actions. E.F. Hutton & Co., 42 Colo. App. 497, 596 P.2d at 415; Svejcara v. Whitman,
82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167, 169 (1971); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878); See
also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (double jeopardy in a criminal case).
However, jurisdictions which prohibit punitive damages do so on the basis of
double jeopardy. Here, it is argued that the "punitive" element of the award is
within the scope of criminal law, not civil. Thus, the defendant who may have al-
ready been convicted of a criminal offense, such as assault or battery, may be sub-
ject to another "penalty" in a civil action. See Huber v. Teuber, 10 D.C. (3
MacArth.) 484 (1897); Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193 (1857); Austin and Wife v. Wil-
son and Wife, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 273 (1849); Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878); Fay &
Ux v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872).
49. The due process challenge is akin to the double jeopardy attack. It is
claimed that because punitive damages protect societal interests (punishment, de-
terrence), the doctrine constitutes a criminal remedy; thus, the defendant is enti-
freedom of speech and press, 5o and equal protection. 51
To date, none of these general attacks have been particularly
convincing to the courts which have allowed punitive damages. It
is felt that the usefulness of the doctrine, in punishing and deter-
ring harmful conduct, sufficiently outweighs the interests pro-
pounded by opponents to the doctrine.52
However, one area which warrants special attention is the due
process challenge with regard to multiple awards of punitive dam-
ages in products liability actions involving mass production of a
defective product. In Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 53 the defendant
argued that the court should adopt a rule that where punitive
damages are awarded in a products liability suit, the court should
limit the punitive damages recovery to the first plaintiff and deny
them to all subsequent plaintiffs in cases arising out of the same
tled to the due process safeguards afforded defendants in a criminal action.
GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 43, at § 3.03. This argument has been widely re-
jected. The courts have held that the protections afforded a criminal defendant
are not afforded a defendant in a civil action with respect to punitive damages.
Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 943, 93 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1971); Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See United States v.
Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896) (civil defendant has no sixth amendment right to be
confronted with witnesses in a civil case). See also United States v. Regan, 232
U.S. 37 (1914) (burden of proof in a civil proceeding to recover a monetary penalty
is a "reasonable preponderance" of the evidence rather that "proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt").
50. See generally GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 43, at § 3.04. The issue here
has generally involved the conflicting policies of punishment and deterrence of li-
bel and prevention of a "chilling effect" on the press. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the
Supreme Court held that the first amendment precluded punitive damages when
there was not a complete showing of "actual malice" under the Sullivan test. Id.
at 349. On the whole, the lower federal courts have allowed punitive damages
when "actual malice" has been found. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1977); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977); Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
See generally Comment, Constitutionality of Punitive Damages in Libel Action, 45
FORDHm L. REV. 1382 (1977).
51. The attacks under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment have been brought by plaintiffs who have been denied recovery of punitive
damages under state wrongful death statutes. As most jurisdictions have not al-
lowed punitive damages under these statutes, the plaintiffs contend that the state
discriminates when it allows recovery of punitive damages for other causes of ac-
tion but denies recovery of such damages under the wrongful death statute. See
generally GHIARDI & KiRCHER, supra note 43, at § 3.05.
Attacks on the wrongful death statutes have had little or no success to date.
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389
F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); Georgie Boy Mfg., Inc. v. Superior Court of Los An-
geles County, 115 Cal. App. 3d 217, 171 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1981); Robert v. Ford Motor
Co., 73 A.D.2d 1024, 424 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1980).
52. See supra note 25. See also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294
N.W.2d 437, 461 (1980). See generally Owen, supra note 4.
53. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
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wrongful act.54 While the court saw no reason to limit punitive
damages in this way,5 5 it may be argued that individual punitive
damage awards in several separate cases may, when weighed cu-
mulatively, deprive the defendant of his due process rights. This
argument finds its genesis in Palko v. Connecticut 56 and is devel-
oped in Hoag v. New Jersey. 5 7
In Palko, the Supreme Court suggested that a defendant's
rights to due process might be denied if the state, by its multiple
prosecutions, was seeking "to wear the accused out."58 The
Supreme Court in Hoag further held that while the fourteenth
amendment did not per se prohibit a state from bringing consecu-
tive actions to prosecute separate offenses, "Itihe question in any
given case is whether such a course has led to fundamental
unfairness."5 9
The "fundamental fairness" of leveling consecutive punitive
damage awards against a manufacturer is questionable. However,
"fundamental fairness" also dictates that an injured party be fully
compensated. Just as it is important to protect a going business
concern, it is also important to protect the health and safety of
the public.
54. 294 N.W.2d at 466.
55. Id. The court held:
The gravamen of Ford's alleged offense is not only the manufacture and
distribution of the car but the injury caused thereby. We are not per-
suaded that the federal and state constitutions require us to limit punitive
damages arising from a single incident to a single award for punitive dam-
ages, and we do not adopt such a rule. We believe that a wrongdoer is
protected against oppressive multiple awards by the judicial controls we
have set herein.
Id. The "judicial controls" ut:ilized by the Wangen court included (1) initial deter-
mination by the trial judge concerning the propriety of punitive damages in a par-
ticular case; (2) determination of the amount of punitive damages, by the jury,
which considers the nature of the defendant's acts, the degree of malicious intent,
the potential damage, the actual damage, and the defendant's ability to pay (tak-
ing into account previous compensatory and punitive damages imposed); (3) con-
trol by the judge over an "excessive" award by the jury. Id. at 457-61. The use of
these judicial controls was felt sufficient to counter the threat of a'punitive dam-
age award bankrupting a manufacturer. Id. at 461. See generally Mallor and Rob-
erts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639
(1980); Owen, supra note 4, at 1314-25.
56. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
57. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
58. Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
59. Hoag, 356 U.S. at 467.
B. Punitive Damages and the Threat of "Overkill"
It has been argued, with some force, that the purposes of pun-
ishment and deterrence are substantially furthered by allowing
punitive damages in mass products liability litigation.60 The diffi-
culty arises when considering how much punishment is adequate.
To allow every plaintiff a "full measure" of punitive damages
would most certainly result in "overkill." 61 Additionally, the pri-
mary policies served by punitive damages would be subverted.
The goal of such damages is punishment of the offender and de-
terrence of further action of the same type by the offending party
and others. These policies are chiefly designed to protect the
public. To afford each plaintiff a right to punitive damages is to
blur the distinction between private compensation and public pro-
tection 62 thereby granting a windfall to later plaintiffs and creat-
60. Owen, supra note 4, at 1278-99. Professor Owen delineates four major
functions of punitive damages: punishment, deterrence, law enforcement, and
compensation. With regard to law enforcement, Professor Owen speaks of induc-
ing "private persons to enforce the rules of law by rewarding them for bringing
malefactors to justice." Id. at 1278. He states further-
Detractors of the punitive damages doctrine, minimizing its role in pun-
ishing wrongdoers and deterring misconduct, frequently criticize the doc-
trine for allowing the plaintiff a "windfall" in addition to any
compensation for losses he may actually have sustained. But this criti-
cism of the doctrine invariably overlooks the important fact that this pro-
spective windfall motivates many reluctant plaintiffs to press their claims.
And as the litigation of such claims increases, misconduct is increasingly
punished and deterred.
Id. at 1287 (footnote omitted).
In rebuttal, it must be noted that the doctrine of punitive damages is supported
by the public policy considerations of punishment and deterrence. When these
policies clash with another public policy, that of protecting a going business con-
cern from possible bankruptcy flowing from excessive punitive damages awards,
the value of motivating "reluctant plaintiffs" with hopes of a windfall must be bal-
anced against the substantial threat of inducing a corporate bankruptcy. If bank-
ruptcy becomes more than a "theoretical threat" in any one case, then the policies
of punishment and deterrence are more than fully served, and there is no more
need to award punitive damages, much less allow the plaintiff a windfall. Con-
versely, the balance has swung in favor of the policies protecting a going business
concern. At the very least, such an imminent threat of inducing a corporate bank-
ruptcy should counsel judicial restraint in the award of any further punitive
damages.
61. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Given the difficulty of con-
solidating claims for hearing before one court (See Comment, Mass Liability and
Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1797, 1803-04 (1979)), claims will be
heard by several courts. Even if one court reasonably limits the amount awarded
as punitive damages by exercise of "judicial control," there is no guarantee that
another court will consider past or even contemporaneous punitive awards when
making its own assessment. Indeed, it would be nearly impossible to keep up to
date on all punitive awards given in products liability litigation. Thus, ten or one
hundred "reasonable" awards, as judged in each case, may quickly add up to a
crippling amount imposed on a manufacturer.
62. This blurring of private compensation and public protection is seen in Neal
v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376-77: "Punitive damages are a recover-
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ing "overkill." The emphasis in such a case has impermissibly
shifted from public protection to excessive private gain.
The threat of overkill becomes most pressing if no provision is
made limiting full recovery of punitive damages to those plaintiffs
first in line. This proposal, however, has engendered contro-
versy 63 and appears almost unmanageable. 64 Despite these draw-
backs, and the possiblity of "unlimited punishment,"65 this
proposal demands the least restructuring of the present system. 66
Professor Owen, a leading authority, has stated:
Thus, while courts must be especially vigilant to control the very real,
but by no means certain, risk of excessive punishment in mass disaster
cases, the initial plaintiffs in appropriate cases should receive punitive
damages awards that reward their efforts. Plaintiffs following soon there-
after whose successful prosecutions of punitive damages claims confirm
,the first award, should be be permitted to recover enhanced punitive dam-
ages awards for similar reasons. Thereafter, however, punitive damages
able item of relief so long as the conduct exhibited by the defendant with respect
to that individual plaintiff can be termed as 'outrageous' and a reckless indiffer-
ence to the rights of that plaintiff." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 908(2) (1979)).
The "punishment" aspect of punitive damages has two applications. First, to al-
low the injured party "revenge" on the defendant who injured him. Second, to
"express the public's condemnation of the misconduct and remind manufacturers
of their responsibilities for consumer safety." Owen, supra note 4, at 1282 (foot-
note omitted). Though the element of personal revenge may have some impor-
tance in a modern legal system, the overriding purpose of the doctrine of punitive
damages is the protection of society. This is further evidenced by the "deter-
rence" aspect of punitive damages. "In its retributive role, punishment satisfies
the individual's and society's need for vengeance, and thus serves to rectify some
of the negative effects of prior misconduct. But perhaps the predominant purpose
of most punishment, including punitive damages, is the deterrence of similar mis-
conduct in the future." Id. at 1282-83 (footnote omitted).
63. See Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376-77; Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 304-08, 294 N.W.2d at 454-55.
64. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[WI e
think it somewhat unrealistic to expect a judge, say in New Mexico, to tell a jury
that their fellow townsman should get very little by way of punitive damages be-
cause...Roginsky...in New York had stripped the cupboard bare .... )
65. Opponents of the doctrine of punitive damages contend that the doctrine
is "fundamentally unfair" aside from any function of punishment or deterrence.
The contention is that, in the practical application of the doctrine, the civil defend-
ant may be subject to harsher penalties than a criminal defendant for the same or
a similar offense. It is argued that none of the procedural safeguards in a criminal
action are available to a civil defendant, and that the jury is not hindered by any
limit, save the judge's discretion that the award is excessive, when awarding puni-
tive damages. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 43, at § 2.12.
66. Other proposals run the gamut from outright abolition of punitive damages
(see Carsey, supra note 47) to keeping a running total of past awards and submit-
ting this figure to the judge, who compares it with what the jury in the case at
hand has awarded. Comment, supra note 61, at 1797.
recoveries should probably be limited to reasonable costs of litigation.
And once the bankruptcy of the defendant manufacturer appears to be a
real and imminent possibility, punitive damages should no longer be avail-
able at all. 67
If punitive damages are to be an effective means of punishing
and deterring outrageous conduct on the part of manufacturers, to
protect the public, the court must carefully consider past awards
and the extent to which the policies of punishment and deter-
rence have already been fulfilled. Additionally, the court must
also consider that the primary purpose of the plaintiff in bringing
suit is to obtain compensation for personal injuries proximately
caused by the defendant.
The protection of public interests, while admittedly of value,
must not be allowed to "consume" the personal compensation
rightfully due to an injured plaintiff. If excessive awards of puni-
tive damages pose a "very real" risk to the continued existence of
a business, they also pose a serious threat to the recovery of com-
pensatory damages by future plaintiffs. If the courts fail to limit
excessive punitive awards, either by judicial self-control or by
some other procedural means, the defendant manufacturer who
chooses Chapter 11 reorganization may jeopardize a plaintiff's le-
gitimate claim for compensation.
IV. MANVILLE CORPORATION ASBESTOS LITIGATION
A. The Manville Corporation
After World War I, the asbestos industry burgeoned as new
uses were discovered for the product. Between 1925 and 1974,
Johns-Manville emerged as a leader in the field; the corporation's
annual sales increased from $40 million to over $1 billion.68 By
December 31, 1981, the Manville Corporation was one of the na-
tion's largest companies and the world's largest single producer of
asbestos. 69 The corporation's reported sales for 1981 totalled
nearly $2.2 billion, and the corporation employed nearly 30,500
people.70
B. Products Liability
The available evidence shows that Manville knew of the
hazards of asbestos and withheld that knowledge from its em-
ployees. 7 ' Whatever the corporation's motive for this nondisclo-
67. Owen, supra note 4, at 1325.
68. BERMAN, supra note 26, at 84.
69. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
70. Id.
71. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973).
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sure, it is apparent that the Manville Corporation did not foresee
the multitude of lawsuits that would result.
The seminal case in asbestos litigation was Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Products Corporation,72 which was brought by an insula-
tion worker who had been disabled by asbestosis and mesothe-
lioma.73 The plaintiff alleged that Johns-Manville and other
manufacturers of asbestos-containing materials74 had breached
their duty of due care for the failure to warn of the dangers inher-
ent in handling asbestos. The trial court presented the case to the
jury on counts of negligence, gross negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict liability. While the jury found that no defendant
was grossly negligent, :it did find all defendants strictly liable on
the basis of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 75
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that asbestos was
a product rendered "unreasonably dangerous" for failure of the
defendants to give "adequate warnings of the known or knowable
dangers involved."76 Stating the rule that a manufacturer in cases
similar to this is held to the "knowledge and skill of an expert,"
the court stressed that, given this status, the manufacturer has a
duty to "keep abreast of scientific knowledge, discoveries, and ad-
72. Id. at 1076.
73. Id. at 1081. Borel testified that during his usual workday his clothes would
become so dusty that he was engulfed in a cloud of dust. "I blowed this dust out
of my nostrils by handfuls at the end of the day .. " Id. at 1082.
74. Borel named eleven defendants. He settled out of court with four, and the
fifth received an instructed verdict. The six remaining defendants were:
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., Pittsburgh Corning
Corp., Philip Carey Corp., Armstrong Cork Corp., and Ruberoid Corp., a division of
GAF Corp. Id. at 1086.. Borel died before trial and his wife was substituted as
plaintiff. Id.
75. Applying § 402A to "occupational diseases" was here a matter of first im-
pression. Bore 493 F.2d at 1103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
76. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1088.
vances and is presumed to know what is imparted thereby. 77
The court held further:
[A] seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that are reason-
ably foreseeable. The requirement of foreseeability coincides with the
standard of due care in negligence cases in that a seller must exercise rea-
sonable care and foresight to discover a danger in his product and to warn
users and consumers of that danger. 7 8
On rehearing, Johns-Manville and two other defendants argued
that strict liability was improperly imposed because they had in
fact placed a "warning label" on their products. Justice Wisdom,
writing for the Fifth Circuit, retorted that "none of these 'cau-
tions' intimated the gravity of the risks;" they were therefore in-
adequate warnings.7 9 He summed up the case as follows:
The unpalatable facts are that in the twenties and thirties the hazards of
working with asbestos were recognized; that the United States Public
Health Service documented the significant risks in asbestos textile facto-
ries in 1938;... that in 1961 Dr. Irving Selikoff [sic] and his colleagues con-
firmed the deadly relationship between insulation work and
asbestosis .... On the evidence before it, the jury could properly have
decided that Borel received no warnings at all from any defendant at a
time when the defendants were under a duty to warn him.8 0
Borel was decided in 1973. Once it had been demonstrated that
manufacturers of asbestos-containing materials were susceptible
to liability, workers suffering from asbestos-related diseases, who
had often been frustrated in attempts to obtain a remedy through
state workman's compensation plans, saw their chance. By 1980,
more than two thousand asbestos cases had been filed in the
United States.8 1
The number of asbestos cases swelled further when the courts
began to give collateral estoppel effect to certain aspects of Borel.
In Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 82 another case brought upon the
77. Id. at 1089. Justice Wisdom also stated that the "manufacturer has a duty
to test and inspect his product." Id. at 1089-90.
78. Id. at 1088.
79. Id. at 1104. The three labels were substantially the same. Johns-Manville's
read as follows:
This product contains asbestos fiber. Inhalation of asbestos in excessive
quantities over long periods of time may be harmful.
If dust is created when this product is handled, avoid breathing the dust.
If adequate ventilation control is not possible wear respirators approved
by the U.S. Bureau of Mines for pneumoconiosis producing dusts.
Id. at 1106.
80. Id.
81. Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Tex. 1980). The as-
bestos defendants had won only a dozen or so.
82. Id. at 244-45 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and
Products Liability: Reasoning With The Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 19, 38
(1982).
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of a fact or issue when a court of
competent jurisdiction has rendered a final adjudication of the issue on
the merits. Both parties in the subsequent suit are bound by the original
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theory of strict liability, the court held that in order for the plain-
tiff to prove his case he must establish: (1) that the defendants
manufactured, marketed, sold, or distributed insulation products;
(2) that the asbestos -products as manufactured, marketed, sold,
or distributed were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (3)
that the plaintiff was exposed to any of the defendants' asbestos
products; (4) that his exposure to any of the defendants' asbestos
products was sufficient to be a producing cause of certain lung
diseases, including asbestosis and mesothelioma; (5) he has, or
had, asbestosis or mesothelioma; and (6) he suffered damages. 83
The court then held that the defendants were collaterally es-
topped to deny that asbestos products were "dangerous and un-
reasonably defective" as determined in Borel.84 The court found
further that asbestos-containing products are defective and un-
reasonably dangerous as a matter of law;8 5 and, also as a matter
of law, that asbestos is a "competent producing cause" of asbesto-
sis, mesothelioma, and other lung diseases. 8 6
Collateral estoppel was applied in several subsequent cases,
but this trend was recently reversed in Hardy v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp. 87 The Fifth Circuit reversed a district court and held
that collateral estoppel could not be used to prevent defendants
who were not parties in Borel from presenting evidence tending
to show that their asbestos products were not unreasonably dan-
decision if the party claimed to be estopped had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the earlier action.
Erlenbach, supra, at 25 (footnotes omitted). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). "The general rule should be that in cases where a plain-
tiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where ... application of offen-
sive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use
of offensive collateral estoppel." Id. at 331.
83. Mooney, 485 F. Supp. at 244.
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id. at 250.
86. Id. Mooney was upheld in Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp.
836 (E.D. Tex. 1980), a case heard that same year. Asbestos was held to be defec-
tive as a matter of law despite Johns-Manville's assertion that the asbestos con-
tained in its cement pipes was not defective as was the insulation in Borel. In
Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part and
remanded, 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981), a case handed down one month after
Flatt, the court held that Nicolet Industries was collaterally estopped for denying
that asbestos was an unreasonably dangerous product. This was upheld even
though Nicolet Industries had not been one of the defendants in Borel. See supra
note 74.
87. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
gerous for failure to warn.88 Also, the court held that the present
issue of whether the products were unreasonably dangerous must
be judged according to current scientific knowledge giving rise to
possibly different types of warnings. Therefore, because this was
a different issue, factually, from that in Borel, collateral estoppel
could not apply to even the "Borel-defendants".89
The court also took notice of the fact that, in Borel, the defend-
ants were liable for $68,000 in damages. It was held to be unfair to
give collateral estoppel effect to the Borel judgment because "it is
very doubtful that these defendants could have foreseen that
their $68,000 liability to plaintiff Borel would foreshadow multimil-
lion dollar asbestos liability."9 0 The implication was that the de-
fendants would fight multimillion dollar suits much more
vigorously than mere $68,000 suits, and preclusion of important is-
sues denied the defendants a fair trial. The court concluded by
recognizing that giving collateral estoppel effect to Borel had
"opened the floodgates to an enormous, unprecedented volume of
asbestos litigation:" 91
According to a recent estimate, there are over 3,000 asbestos plaintiffs in
the Eastern District of Texas alone and between 7,500 and 10,000 asbestos
cases pending in the United States District Courts around the country.
The omnibus order here involves 58 pending cases, and the many plain-
tiffs involved in this case are each seeking $2.5 million in damages. Such a
staggering potential liability could not have been foreseen by the Borel
defendants.9 2
C. The Punitive Damages Dilemma
By August, 1982, the Manville Corporation was faced with over
16,000 asbestos-related lawsuits. 93 The corporation reported that
defending the lawsuits had cost it $8.6 million in the first half of
1982.94
That same August, the District Court for the Eastern District of
88. 681 F.2d at 338-41.
89. Id. at 344-45. The court also stated a second reason to deny collateral es-
toppel effect to the Borel judgment-the fact that the asbestos defendants had
won some recent cases.
90. 681 F.2d at 346.
91. Id. at 347.
92. Id. at 347. See generally Erlenbach, supra note 82.
93. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. More than 200 other companies
were faced with asbestos claims. Id., Aug. 10, 1982, at D2, col. 2.
94. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1982, at D2, col. 1. The Asbestos Compensation Coali-
tion told reporters that it costs the "defendant companies an average of $150,000 to
put $28,000 into the hands of a successful claimant." Id. The difference went to
legal fees and expenses. Id. UNR Industries, a Chicago-based asbestos firm had
spent more than $26 million on asbestos litigation since the beginning of 1980. Id.
UNR Industries filed for a Chapter 11 reorganization on July 29, 1982. N.Y. Times,
July 30, 1982, at D12, col. 6. At the time of filing, UNR was faced with some 12,000
lawsuits. Id. at D1, col. 2.
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Pennsylvania handed down its decision in Neal v. Carey Cana-
dian Mines, Ltd.95 The court upheld an award of punitive dam-
ages against the Manville Corporation, noting that "[tjhe punitive
damages awarded in this case were the first punitive damages
ever awarded against Johns-Manville in asbestos litigation."9 6
On the issue of liability,97 the jury found that all of the supplier
defendants, including Johns-Manville, were liable under section
402A, and that the employer, Celotex, was liable for "the aggrava-
tion of each plaintiff's injuries because of its intentional failure to
warn."
98
The jury found Celotex and Johns-Manville liable for punitive
damages due to their "outrageous conduct." 99 Upon subsequent
denial of the defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v., the court af-
firmed the punitive damages awards, holding: (1) that the evi-
dence was sufficient to show that the defendants' conduct was
"4outrageous" so as to support an award of punitive damages;1 00
(2) that Johns-Manville's apprehension that punitive damages im-
posed in mass tort litigation would "annihilate or bankrupt" a cor-
95. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The decision is dated Aug. 31, 1982.
96. 548 F. Supp. at 377. The case was brought by twenty-four former employ-
ees of Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., a manufacturer of asbestos insulation, against
Celotex Corporation, the successor in interest to Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., and
against suppliers of asbestos, including the Johns-Manville Corporation. Johns-
Manville was the principal supplier. Id. at 365. Ultimately, fifteen of the twenty-
four claims were consolidated for trial, and the case was heard before a jury in
1981. Id.
97. The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated by the court. Id.
98. 548 F. Supp. at 366. In Pennsylvania, an employee's remedy against his em-
ployer is limited to workmen's compensation (Pennsylvania Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1201-1603 (Purdon 1952)) unless the employer
intentionally acts to injure his employee. Allegations of "willful," "Wanton," or
"reckless" acts are not sufficient to state a cause of action outside of workmen's
compensation. Ulicny v. National Dust Collector Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1265, 1268
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania law); See also Keating v. Shell Chem. Co.,
610 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 19810); Austion v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp.
313, 316 (D. Me. 1981).
99. Nea4 548 F. Supp. at 366. Total compensatory damages awarded were
$1,213,500; total punitive, $438,000. Of the punitive award, $343,000 was assessed
against Johns-Manville; Celotex was found liable for $95,000. Id. at 366-67 n.4. Pu-
nitive damages claims against all other supplier defendants were dismissed be-
cause "'presence alone or knowledge alone or involvement on an association basis
without more or even possession of the knowledge without some further evidence
as to wantonness is insufficient to support the question of punitive damages being
considered by the jury.'" Id. at 375 (quoting the record of the trial, N.T. 23.57).
100. 548 F. Supp. at 374-76. Pennsylvania has adopted the rule of punitive dam-
ages as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908. Id. at 374. See supra
note 43.
poration was exaggerated;lO' (3) that the threat of "excessive"
punitive damage awards was effectively met by judicial control;10 2
(4) that the defendants' due process rights were not violated by
punitive damage awards in this case; 0 3 (5) that the defendants
were not subject to double jeopardy;10 4 and (6) that Johns-
Manville's failure to affix an adequate warning on a known dan-
gerous product constituted "reckless indifference of the health
and safety of plaintiffs in light of the knowledge held by its corpo-
rate officials." 0 5
The aspect of the judgment most devastating to the Manville
Corporation was the holding that each plaintiff who could show
that the corporation's conduct as to him was "outrageous" was al-
lowed to claim punitive damages. 0 6 It was against this holding
that the corporation unsuccessfully advanced their argument ex-
pressing a fear of bankruptcy.
The Manville Corporation, if not the court, recognized the pre-
101. 548 F. Supp. at 376-77.
102. 548 F. Supp. at 377. Pennsylvania law requires the punitive damages award
to bear a "reasonable relation[ship] to the amount of actual damages suffered by
[each] plaintiff." Id. at 377. See Givens v. W.J. Gilmore Drug Co., 337 Pa. 278, 10
A.2d 12, 16 (1940).
103. 548 F. Supp. at 377. The essence of due process is "fundamental fairness."
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Johns-Manville argued that the stan-
dards for punitive damages were so vague that the company was denied adequate
notice of which wrongful conduct was being punished. Also, the lack of any "legal-
ly fixed standard" left the judge and jury virtually unguided in determining what
conduct was wrongful.
The court answered by citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159
(1967), in which the Supreme Court held that the standard of "outrageous con-
duct"-wanton disregard of the rights of others-provided adequate notice to de-
fendants that they may be subject to punitive damages for their conduct. 548 F.
Supp. at 377.
104. 548 F. Supp. at 377-78. Johns-Manville contended that to allow each plain-
tiff to recover punitive damages would be to violate the company's fifth amend-
ment rights by exposing it to "successive punishment" for "the same act." Id. at
377. The court countered by holding, as a matter of law, that because the company
owed a duty to each plaintiff, punitive damages could be claimed by each plaintiff
because the conduct of Johns-Manville was "outrageous" as to each. Id. at 377-78.
See supra notes 48 & 62.
105. 548 F. Supp. at 378. The evidence introduced at trial showed that Johns-
Manville had specifically been advised by Mr. Hugh M. Jackson, Director of Safety
for Johns-Manville from 1947-1952 and manager of the industrial health program
from 1952-1960, that inhalation of asbestos dust presented serious health hazards.
Johns-Manville was advised in the 1950's to affix a warning on its asbestos prod-
ucts, but such a warning was not affixed until 1969. Id. at 375.
Also, Dr. Kenneth Wallace Smith, medical officer for Canadian Johns-Manville
from 1943 or 1944 to 1951, after which he served as medical officer for the entire
Johns-Manville corporation until 1966, conducted his own study of asbestos inhala-
tion in the late 1940's. As a result of his research, in 1952 Dr. Smith recommended
to the highest corporate officials of Johns-Manville that a warning should be at-
tached to their asbestos products. His advice was ignored until 1969. Id. at 375-76.
106. 548 F. Supp. at 376-77.
[Vol. 11: 151, 1983] The Manville Corporation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
cedent set by the decision. In every subsequent suit brought in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, each
plaintiff could claim punitive damages; other courts might also fol-
low the Neal court's lead. In the eyes of the Manville Corpora-
tion, at least, the "theoretical" threat of bankruptcy flowing from
punitive damages "overkill" began to take on substance.
V. BANKRupTcy
The threat of bankruptcy was realized on August 26, 1982. The
Manville Corporation on that date filed for Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.107
In an interview, John A. McKinney, president and chief execu-
tive officer of the corporation, reported that while the corporation
was still in "good shape," the corporation was "completely over-
whelmed" by the asbestos litigation. 108 A Massachusetts consult-
ing firm had advised Manville that it could expect to be faced with
up to 52,000 lawsuits with resulting potential liability of $2 bil-
lion.10 9 Manville's reported assets at the time of filing were val-
ued at $2.2 billion, but. because generally accepted accounting
principles require a company to set aside funds as a reserve
against anticipated claims,n 0 the corporation felt it had "no
choice" but to fie under Chapter 11.111
A. Chapter 11 Reorganization
Filing a Chapter 11 petition automatically stays the commence-
ment, continuation or enforcement of a "judicial, administrative,
or other proceeding against the debtor."l12 The primary purpose
of Chapter 11 is the "rehabilitation" of the debtor, not the liquida-
tion of his estate."l3 Thus, the debtor usually retains possession
of assets and makes payments to creditors pursuant to a court-ap-
107. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also Time Mag., Sept. 6, 1982, at 17.
110. See Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 5 as reported in
MILLER, COMPREHENSIVE GAA.P GUIDE § 6.01 (1981).
111. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. Time Mag., Sept. 6, 1982, at 17.
James Beasley, treasurer at Manville, reported that the costs could be much more
than those projected by the consulting firm. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
113. EPSTEIN & LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 372
proved plan." 4
This plan must be filed with the court. 115 After filing the plan,
the debtor must obtain approval of the plan from its creditors and
stockholders. The plan is deemed "accepted" when a majority of
creditors, who hold two-thirds of the total claims against the
debtor, approve the plan. Stockholders "accept" the plan when
holders of two-thirds of the total voting interest approve the
plan." 6
After acceptance, the plan must be confirmed by the court." 7
Confirmation may be denied if the judge determines that the plan
is not in the best interests of those creditors or shareholders who
did not accept the plan." 8 The plan will not be in the best inter-
est of those non-approving creditors or shareholders who would
receive less under the plan than they would under Chapter 7
liquidation.n 9
If the judge determines that the plan is in the best interests of
all parties, he may confirm the plan over the objections of the mi-
nority. 120 Upon confirmation, the debtor is discharged from all of
its pre-petition debts except as provided in (1) the plan, (2) the
order confirming the plan, and (3) section 1141(d) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.121
B. Bankruptcy and Asbestos Liability
The filing of the petition in bankruptcy virtually paralyzes the
resolution of asbestos-related claims. Claimants may petition to
(2d ed. 1982). The two general forms of bankruptcy are: (1) liquidation and (2) re-
habilitation.
By far, the greatest number of filings are for liquidation. Id. Chapter 7 of the
BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 701, is entitled "Liquidation." Basically, the trustee
in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 is empowered to collect the non-exempt assets of
the debtor, reduce them to cash, and distribute the proceeds to the creditors. The
debtor then hopes for a discharge of his remaining debts.
A filing under Chapter 11 of the BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 1101, or under
Chapter 13 of the BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 1301, initiates a process of "reor-
ganization" of rehabilitation or the debtor's assets. Here, the debtor usually re-
tains his assets, and most often retains management of them, and makes
payments out of future earnings to his creditors pursuant to a "plan" of
repayment.
114. The "plan" is the key element of a Chapter 11 reorganization. See 11
U.S.C. § 1121 (Supp. V 1981).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (Supp. V 1981).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (Supp. V 1981).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (Supp. V 1981).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (ii) (Supp. V 1981).
119. Id.
120. This is referred to as a "cram down." EPSTEIN AND LANDERS, supra note
113, at 380. See BANKRUPTCY CODE §§ 1129(a)(8), 1129(b)(1978).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (Supp. V 1981). Section 1142(d) excepts from discharge,
among other debts, those debts excepted by § 523.
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have the automatic stay modified so as to try cases up to the point
of judgment to determine damages; the claims would then be
treated like any other debt the asbestos manufacturer owes. 122
However, a lifting of the stay for purposes of enforcing a judicial
lien123 is unlikely. Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that relief from a stay will be granted to enforce a judicial
lien only if the party seeking relief can prove "lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party," or, with re-
spect to a stay of an act against property, if the debtor does not
have an equity interest in such property and "such property is
not necessary to an effective reorganization." 2 4
* Because the Manville Corporation is solvent under the Bank-
ruptcy Code,125 there is little danger of inadequate protection of
the judicial lien-holder"s interest in the debtor's property. Reten-
tion of corporate assets may readily be shown to be necessary to
an effective reorganization. Furthermore, the purpose of the auto-
matic stay is to give "the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors:"126
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections pro-
vided by the bankruptcy laws. . . . It stops all collection efforts, all har-
assment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. 12 7
The automatic stay, within the context of reorganization, "is
designed to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the
debtor's assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in differ-
ent courts."' 28 The creditors' final relief is generally to be ob-
tained as a result of reorganization and payment received
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (Supp. V 1981). A "judicial lien" is a "lien obtained by
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding."
Id. Such a lien is a secured claim under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1, 2) (Supp. V 1981). See In re Saint Peter's School, 16
Bankr. 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) ("The grounds for relief under subsections (d) (1)
and (d) (2) are stated in the alternative.").
125. An entity other than a partnership is "insolvent" for purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Code if its "financial condition" is such that "the sum of such entity's debts
is greater that all of such entity's property," exclusive of property fraudulently
conveyed or exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (26) (A) (Supp. V 1981). As noted before,
Manville Corporation's assets totaled $2.2 billion; its "projected" liabilities, $2 bil-
lion. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
126. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1978).
127. Id. at 54-55.
128. Fidelity Mortgage Inv. v. Camelia Bldrs., Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976).
according to the plan.' 29 This in turn facilitates the twin policies
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: giving the honest debtor a "fresh
start," and providing for the orderly distribution of the debtor's
assets or earnings to his creditors. 130
C. The Extent of the Bankruptcy Court's Jurisdiction
The waters were further muddied when the Supreme Court
ruled that the broad powers given to bankruptcy judges under the
1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act were unconstitutional. 13 1 Before
Northern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 132 the
broad grant of power given to bankruptcy courts133 would have al-
lowed the bankruptcy court to resolve all asbestos-related law-
suits pending against the Manville Corporation, and to determine
independently whether discharge of a particular debt is war-
ranted. It is presently unclear how far the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court will extend in any one case. 34 In Northern
Pipeline, the Supreme Court held that the broad grant of nation-
wide jurisdiction could not be exercised under the Constitution
because the bankruptcy judges were not given the protections of
tenure under Article III of the Constitution.135 Tenure and guar-
anteed "compensation" under Article III serve to preserve the in-
dependence of the judiciary, which is necessary to the effective
functioning of our system of government.1 36
The Court noted that Congress may create courts that are not
Article III courts (so-called "legislative courts"),137 but these
courts have only limited jurisdiction. Legislative courts may
properly exercise jurisdiction over: (1) specialized geographic ar-
129. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 806 (D. Utah, 1981).
130. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
131. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858
(1982).
132. Id.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. III 1981). The Act became effective October 1, 1979.
Section 1471(c) provided that "[tihe bankruptcy court for the district in which a
case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by
this section on the district courts." The bankruptcy court was thus entitled by the
Act to exercise broad jurisdiction. See 1 COLLIERS oN BANKRUPTCY 3.01, at 3-37, 3-
44 to 3-49 (15th ed. 1981).
134. See generally H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
135. 102 S. Ct. at 2865-66. Article III, § 1 of the United States Constitution
provides:
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Of-
fices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Time, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
136. 102 S. Ct. at 2865. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
137. 102 S. Ct. at 2867-71.
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eas, such as territories or the District of Columbia; (2) military
cases; and (3) cases involving "public rights."138 Essentially,
"public rights" are those properly belonging to the executive and
legislative branches; "private rights" are "inherently. . . judicial"
and involve application of private civil law. The broad grant of
power under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 conferred juris-
diction over "private rights." The lack of tenure of the judges
rendered the grant of broad jurisdiction under the Act
unconstitutional.
The distinction between "public rights" and "private rights"
raises special problems in bankruptcy proceedings. As one com-
mentator has stated:
[I] n the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, it is not clear which rights
are public and which are private.... The responsiblities of the bank-
ruptcy court in conducting a bankruptcy proceeding include staying law-
suits against the bankrupt, collecting the bankrupt's assets, conducting
"summary proceedings" concerning property of the bankrupt that is
within the actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, al-
lowing or disallowing claims, and adjudicating fraudulent conveyances
and preferences. In varying degrees, all of these functions require bank-
ruptcy judges to adjudicate questions of private civil law; however, it is
doubtful whether a bankruptcy court could efficiently adjudicate bank-
ruptcy petitions unless it were permitted to exercise authority over these
ancillary matters.
13 9
D. Discharge
With respect to the Manville Corporation, the question of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction has particular application to the
availability of a discharge of the corporation's debts. Bankruptcy
Code section 1141(d) (1) (a) provides that court confirmation of
the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization "discharges the debtor from
any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation." 140 A
"discharge" relieves the debtor from all pre-petition debts and
some post-petition debts that are treated as pre-petition debts. 41
138. Id. at 2870 (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)). "Pub-
lic rights" are rights which: (1) may have been exclusively determined by the ex-
ecutive or the Congress; (2) involve a claim between the government and others;
and (3) involve the government as a proper party. 102 S. Ct. at 2870-71.
139. H.R. REP., supra note 134, (statement of Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Legal Policy, Dep't of Justice before the House Judiciary
Comm.).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
141. While "discharge" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, "[sjection
727(b) specifies that a discharge, in essence, releases the debtor from all pre-peti-
tion debts, and some post-petition debts which are treated as if they were pre-pe-
Section 1141(d) (2) provides: "The confirmation of a plan does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt excepted from
discharge under section 523 of this title." Section 523(a) provides:
"A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not dis-
charge an individual debtor from any debt -
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to
the property of another entity.1 4 2
The requirement that the debtor's act be "willful and malicious"
has been the subject of continuing debate. In Tinker v. Colwell, 143
the Supreme Court, interpreting the corresponding provision
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898144 determined that the debtor's
conversion of a creditor's property had been intentional and vol-
untary, and, therefore, "willful."145 The Court stated further:
[W]e think a willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act
which is against good morals, and wrongful in and of itself, and which nec-
essarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done
willfully and maliciously, so as to come within the exception. 14 6
Lower courts subsequently expanded this passage to include
"reckless disregard" for the rights of others.147 When the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed, Congress made it clear
that such an expansion was not warranted:
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this
paragraph, "willful" means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1902) [sic] held that a looser standard is
intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply
a "reckless disregard" standard, they are overruled.1 4 8
The legislative history does not define "malicious" and courts
have held that the definition formulated when construing the
phrase under the prior Act still stands. 49 That definition has
been stated as follows:
An injury to person or property may be a malicious injury within this
provision if it was wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the
titon debts. It is this release from debts which is the essence of a discharge."
EPSTEIN & LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 113, at 588.
The post-petition debts treated as pre-petition, for purposes of § 1141(d) are
those specified in §§ 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i). Respectively, these provisions con-
cern an unexpired lease or executory contract, set-offs, and nonrecourse loans.
Id.
142. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (6) (Supp. V 1981).
143. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
144. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17(a) (2), 30 Stat. 550, chap. 541, U.S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 3428.
145. 193 U.S. at 487.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72, 74 (10th Cir. 1955); Harrison v.
Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 1946); see generally United States v. Langer, 12
Bankr. 957, 959 (D.N.D. 1981).
148. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 365 (1977).
149. Langer, 12 Bankr. at 959.
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absence of personal hatred, spite or ill will. The word "willful" means
nothing more than intentionally doing an act which necessarily leads to
injury. Therefore, a wrongful act done intentionally, which necessarily
produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, may constitute a will-
ful and malicious injury.150
An "intentional disregard for the rights of another" may thus
constitute a willful and malicious injury;' 5 ' but, there must be
shown an intent to harm a creditor in order to show malice. 5 2 In
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 153 the court held that the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for an intentional tort
against their employer, thus bringing the case out of the state
workers' compensation act. 5 4 The trial court instructed the jury
that they would have too find by a preponderance of the evidence
"that [the employer] intended to do an act or intended to fail to
do an act [the employer] knew or believed would be substantially
certain to cause harm to the plaintiff" in order to find the em-
ployer liable for intentional "aggravation of a pre-existing work-
connected asbestos-related disease."155 The jury found that the
employer, "through the knowledge and inaction of its highest offi-
cials, despite professional and scientific consultation and advice,
deliberately intended to injure the plaintiffs by choosing to totally
and blatantly disregard [their own company doctor's] warnings
and recommendations that [the workers] be informed about" the
health hazards associated with asbestos. 156
Asbestos-related lawsuits brought against suppliers, however,
150. COLLIERS ON BANKRur-TCY § 17.17(11] (14th ed. 1978). See also COLLIERS ON
BANKRupTcy § 523.16 (15th ed. 1980); Petty v. Dardar, 620 F.2d 39, 40 (5th Cir. 1980).
151. Langer, 12 Bankr. at 960. See also Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 18 Bankr. 591 (N.D. Ala. 1982); Underwood v. Underwood, 17 Bankr. 417
(W.D. Mo. 1981). Gross negligence, no matter how odious, is not a "willful tort" for
purposes of determining discharge of debt. See McElhanor v. Greer, 21 Bankr. 763
(D. Ariz. 1982); Edge v. Simmons, 17 Bankr. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Dans v. White, 18
Bankr. 246 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("reckless disregard" of the rights of others is not suffi-
cient to render liability nondischargeble).
152. Langer, 12 Bankr. at 960. Some courts refuse to give effect to the commit-
tee's "overruling" of Tinker v. Colwell: "It is unclear how much of the definitions
stated in Tinker the committee intended to overrule.... As has already been noted,
the words actually enacted remain unchanged. This raised the question whether a
sentence in a committee report, which is itself ambiguous, overrules 75 years of
consistent judicial interpretation of the identical terms used in the identical con-
text. I think not." Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Simmons, 9 Bankr. 62, 65
(S.D. Fla. 1981).
153. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
154. Id. at 378-81. See infrt note 204 and accompanying text.
155. 548 F. Supp. at 380.
156. Id.
have prevailed on the theories of strict liability and negligence. 57
Because intent is immaterial under a strict liability theory, and
because the negligence theory involves at most "reckless disre-
gard" for the rights of others, the plaintiffs' claims seem not to be
excepted from discharge under section 1141(d).158 This is not
necessarily the case. The original grant of jurisdiction under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978159 empowered the bankruptcy
courts to independently consider whether the acts of the debtor
were "willful and malicious" so as to be excepted from dis-
charge.160 Thus, the bankruptcy court is not bound by the doc-
trine of res judicata to consider only those grounds of liability
that supported a nonbankruptcy court's judgment. As the
Supreme Court held in Brown v. Felsen:161
In sum, we reject [the] contention that res judicata applies here and we
hold that the bankruptcy court is not confined to a review of the judgment
and the record in the prior state-court proceedings when considering the
dischargeability of the [debtor's] debts.16 2
157. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Money v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex.
1980); Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Migues
v. Nicolet Indus., 493 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 622
F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 221-30 and accompany-
ing text. In Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., the award of punitive damages was
based on the defendants' "outrageous conduct" as defined by Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 908 (1965) which provides that "[p unitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or
his reckless indifference to the rights of others." 548 F. Supp. at 375 (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 408 (1965)) (emphasis in original). The award of
punitive damages was based on the evidence that "Johns-Manville engaged in out-
rageous conduct by exhibiting a reckless indifference to the health and wellbeing
of plaintiffs." 548 F. Supp. at 376.
Evidence tending to dispel the "intentional" aspect of the company's "outra-
geous" conduct is seen in Johns-Manville's efforts to issue warnings of some kind
and to distribute information concerning the dangers of exposure to asbestos. Id.
No evidence of such efforts to warn are shown on the part of the employer who, it
is noted, was held to be liable for an intentional tort. See infra notes 233-35.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a)-(c) (Supp. III 1981).
160. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
161. 442 U.S. 127 (1979). The Court was interpreting section 17 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 550, Chap. 541, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3428, which corre-
sponds to the discharge provision of the BANKRUPTcy CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 1141
(Supp. V 1981). Under section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the bankruptcy
court was given the power to make an independent assessment of the "Willful and
malicious" nature of the debtor's act. Id. Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code
does not contain such a grant of jurisdiction; instead, this grant is found in 28
U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. III 1981).
162. 442 U.S. at 138-39. The Court stated further that refusing to apply the doc-
trine of res judicata would permit the bankruptcy court to make an accurate deter-
mination of whether the debtor's acts constituted fraud so as to be
nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at 138. It was also held that Congress in-
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The bankruptcy court may well find upon review of the entire
record of the cases brought against the Manville Corporation that
the acts of the corporation were willful and malicious. The bank-
ruptcy court, however, derives its power to independently deter-
mine whether the debtor's acts are willful and malicious for the
purposes of discharge from the same provision of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 that was held unconstitutional in Northern
Pipeline. Because issues of whether the debtor's tortious acts are
willful and malicious are drawn from the record of the case in a
nonbankruptcy or state court,163 such a determination necessarily
involves matters of private civil law which are not within the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction after the holding in Northern
Pipeline.
Even if the bankruptcy courts are allowed to continue to inde-
pendently determine whether a debtor's acts were willful and ma-
licious, it is by no means certain that the courts will so hold in the
case of the Manville Corporation. The bankruptcy court may be
hard-pressed to find the requisite intent to injure the individual
plaintiffs.16 4
Congress was given until October 4, 1982, to remedy the defects
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The deadline has passed as of this
writing, but a bill conferring Article III protection for bankruptcy
judges was recently approved by the House Judiciary Committee
and may reasonably be expected to become law.165
During the interim, the bankruptcy courts have retained their
broad grant of power.166 As noted, one important aspect of this
tended the bankruptcy court to make such an independent inquiry into the nature
of the debtor's acts despite the fact that liability had been premised on another
basis in the lower court. Id.
163. Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
866 (1951).
164. See, e.g., Laatsch v. Stanfield, 14 Bankr. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (de-
fendant was found guilty of1 vehicular homicide in state court, but the bankruptcy
court held that absent evidence that defendant intended to injure anyone, her con-
duct was not "willful and malicious" so as to render the claim for wrongful death
nondischargeable). See supra note 158.
165. L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1983, at 5, col. 1. This is H.R. 6978, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). See supra notes 134, 139.
166. See supra note 134, at 18. Transition from the present system to the ten-
ured system of H.R. 6978 was expected to be completed by March 31, 1983. Deci-
sions of the bankruptcy courts in the meantime are to be afforded their intended
weight; the Supreme Court held only that Bankruptcy Code § 241 (a) precluded a
permanent system of untenured judges. See infra note 167 and accompanying
text.
grant of power is the ability to stay all pending litigation against
the debtor. With respect to the Manville reorganization, this stay
prevents any imposition of liability on the corporation during re-
organization or until the stay is lifted. The stay, however, oper-
ates only against commencement or continuation of a suit against
the filing debtor. Any named co-defendants remain subject to
suit. The Supreme Court recently allowed suit against Manville's
former co-defendants to proceed despite the "empty chair
defense."167
E. Federal Legislation
It is likely that the Manville Corporation will stay in reorganiza-
tion until Congress provides legislation compensating asbestos
victims. The industry in general, and the Manville Corporation in
particular, has long contended that the United States government
should contribute at least part of the expense of compensating as-
bestos workers.168
This contention is based on the fact that during World War II
and thereafter, the government required the use of asbestos insu-
lation on Navy ships.' 69 At the height of ship-building activity
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. V 1981) provides: "The bankruptcy court in
which a case under title 11 is commenced shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of
the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such
case." On February 22, 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed the "interim" grant of
plenary jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court over both public and private rights by
denying the petition of the Keene Corporation, the GAF Corporation and Pacor,
Inc., challenging the authority of the bankruptcy judge handling the Manville reor-
ganization to issue a stay of proceedings against Manville. The judge had ordered
all pending suits against the Manville Corporation stayed as of Manville's filing
under Chapter 11. The three named petitioners were all co-defendants with the
Manville Corporation, and were subject to suit despite the "empty chair defend-
ant." The Supreme Court refused to hear the matter, thereby affirming the bank-
ruptcy judge's order of stay. In re Keene Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1237 (1983). At a hearing
before a House subcommittee of the full Committee of Education and Labor, John
Baldwin, president of Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, a co-defendant with the
Manville Corporation, stated that "when one defendant drops out of a case, the
others must pick up the slack. Not only must they bear the entire costs of de-
fense, but, in many states, they may be required to pay the entire amount of any
judgment." L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, at 19, col. 1.
168. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6; D4, col. 3. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1982,
at D1, col. 3.
169. See Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Coast Guard and Navigation of
the Full House Comm. of Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 456
(1980). Introduced at the hearing was the "Maritime Administration Standard
Specifications for Merchant Ship Construction: Insulation Lagging for Piping and
Machinery." Asbestos is termed "mineral fibers;" corresponding federal specifica-
tion: "HH-1-558." Asbestos was widely used in naval vessels and merchant marine
vessels. See generally id.
A defense was asserted by Johns-Manville in In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543
F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982) that "as a matter of public policy, a manufacturer
who supplies equipment to the United States [military] ...in a time of war pursuant
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during the war, there were 1,723,000 men and women employed in
shipyards. 17o Many of these workers were exposed to asbestos
dust that was as great, and perhaps greater than, that encoun-
tered by asbestos workers elsewhere.1 7 1 The government must
also be charged with kn.owledge of the reported hazards of expo-
sure to asbestos. Despite such knowledge, regulation of exposure
to hazardous substances was not diligently pursued until the
1960's and 1970's.172
The government to date has denied any liability to those suffer-
ing from asbestos-related diseases, 173 and has repeatedly con-
tended that it is already paying its fair share through the Federal
Employment Compensation Act,174 Medicare, and Social Secur-
ity.' 75 Despite these protests, the filing of the Manville Corpora-
tion for reorganization underlines the need for some legislative
action.176
to government specifications may not be held liable for any inadequacy of the
plans." Id. at 1152 (quoting In re "Agent Orange Product" Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp.
762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). When a defendant raises this defense, he must show:
1. That the government established the specifications for [a product
which allegedly caused an injury]...;
2. That the [product]... manufactured by the defendant met the govern-
ment's specifications in all material respects; and
3. That the government knew as much as or more than the defendant
about the hazards to people that accompanied use of [the product]....
543 F. Supp. at 1152.
170. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 824, WAR-
TIME EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTION, AND CONDITIONS OF WORK IN SHIPYARDS, H.R.
Doc. No. 149, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
171. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1982, at DI, col. 2; D36, col. 1, 2. "During the war I
worked in the shipyards and it just blew like dust. You couldn't see each other for
it because you thought it was harmless." Hearings on Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
447 (statement by George Figua).
172. The U.S. Public HeaXth Service attempted to determine dangerous levels of
exposure to airborne contaminants during World War II. Their findings were not
made available until 1946. BERMAN, supra note 26 at 86. See generally supra note
169.
173. The government is currently a defendant in almost 1,200 asbestos-related
products liability suits brought by nearly 13,000 claimants. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10,
1982, at DI, col. 4.
174. 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (Supp. V 1981). As of December, 1981, the government had
received almost 6,000 claims and had processed a small proportion, paying $9 mil-
lion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1982, at D36, col. 2.
175. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1982, at Dl, col. 2.
176. Two proposals are currently under consideration by Congress. The first,
H.R. 5735, 97th Cong,, 2d Sess. (1982), envisions a federal compensation system
funded entirely by industry, for victims of asbestos and radiation-related diseases;
the second, S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), calls for the creation of a special
one-time commission of government, health, labor and industry representatives to
The primary obstacle to prompt passage of federal compensa-
tion legislation is the question of whether industry or the federal
government should compensate asbestos victims. Given the cur-
rent economic situation, it would be unrealistic to expect easy
passage of any compensation bill which calls for taxpayer sup-
port. On the other hand, if such federal involvement in a compen-
sation scheme is withheld, the industry must certainly pass the
extra costs of compensating asbestos victims to the public.
The alternative to federal legislation is the "resolution" of as-
bestos compensation under the present system: state workers'
compensation or the courts. Neither has proven satisfactory be-
cause most state workers' compensation schemes were intended
to remedy traumatic injuries and are, therefore, ill-designed to
cope with the latent, lingering diseases associated with asbes-
tos. 7 7 Additionally, many asbestos claimants find that their
claims are barred by strict statutes of limitations on occupational
disease.178
In an effort to obtain relief, workers bring suit against the man-
ufacturers of asbestos products. This process, however, by no
establish guidelines which would enable state workers' compensation boards to ef-
ficiently and speedily compensate asbestos victims. In the second scheme, the
government would foot some of the bill. Gary Hart, the sponsor of the senate bill
has observed:
Clearly, although the asbestos companies themselves may bear the
principal financial burden for the social tragedy now confronting us, the
Federal Government, as a regulator, employer, importer, and user, must
share some responsibility for compensating persons with asbestos-related
disease.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1982, at DI, col. 5.
Just as clearly, the asbestos industry favors Senator Hart's bill. On September
9, 1982, the House Education and Labor Committee Subcommittee on Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, chaired by Representative George Miller, opened hear-
ings on the Manville bankruptcy. Representative Miller stated that to allow the
government to compensate victims "would establish a dangerous precedent which
could open the doors of the Treasury to every manufacturer of a hazardous prod-
uct or substance which finds itself confronted with admittedly large liabilities, but
liabilities which are of its own making." N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at D4, col. 5. G.
Earl Parker, a senior vice president for Manville countered: "In every moral, social
and legal sense, the Federal Government is responsible for a substantial number
of the asbestos disease cases we see today." Id. at D4, col. 6.
177. See supra notes 154, 155 and accompanying text. The federal government
has expressed concern over "the tendency for worker's compensation to be un-
derutilized by workers or survivors in cases of occupational illness." Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1981) (prepared statement of Peter S. Barth, Univ.
of Conn.).
178. Workers have succeeded in bringing common law actions against employ-
ers outside of state workers' compensation acts for intentional "aggravation" of
their injuries. Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 379-81 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612
P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Mihcron Chem., 69
Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
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means assures recovery. Also, any recovery that is secured may
be substantially reduced by attorneys' fees and legal costs. With
an estimated 676,000 Americans who will develop lung cancer by
the end of the century as a result of asbestos exposure,179 there is
a serious question as to whether the courts can adequately re-
solve such a number of claims.180 Furthermore, if the courts con-
tinue to allow punitive damages to all plaintiffs, more asbestos
manufacturers will find Chapter 11 reorganization an attractive al-
ternative to litigation.
VI. A "FRESH START" FOR THE SOLVENT DEBTOR
The filing of the Manville Corporation for Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation raises several critical issues. It has been argued that the
Manville filing was an abuse of the federal bankruptcy law. An at-
torney who represents 268 claimants in asbestos-related suits
stated: "It's an outrageous abuse of the judicial process. Chapter
11 is not intended for corporations with $2.2 billion in sales that
are operating in the black."181 This sentiment is widely shared. 82
The bankruptcy courts are essentially courts of equity. In this
context, the demands for "clean hands" are met by allowing only
the "honest debtor" to escape the pressures that drove him into
bankruptcy. It would appear, at first glance, that a corporation
who knowingly failed to provide adequate warnings concerning a
product it manufactured should be denied the haven of the bank-
ruptcy laws and protection from creditors. The fact that the
Manville Corporation was not solely at fault for the widespread
179. L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, at 19, col. 2.
180. Hearings on the Manville Bankruptcy and Amendments on the Bankruptcy
Code Relating to the Northern Pipeline Decision, Subcomm. on Courts of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 113-14 (1982) (statement of
James Franklin Fite, Eastern Regional Director, White Lung Ass'n).
181. Statement by Robert Sweeney in Time Mag., Sept. 6, 1982, at 17. Both UNR
Industries and the Manville Corporation stressed the fact that they were still via-
ble corporations. The filings for Chapter 11 reorganization were made to protect
themselves from pending litigation. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1. An-
other lawyer, Ronald Motley of Barnwell, South Carolina, told reporters: "The
bankruptcy laws weren't set up to allow bailouts for future problems." Id. at D4,
col. 2.
182. Senator Robert Dole, a Republican from Kansas, has called Manville's
filing "dubious." N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at D12, col. 4. Senator Dole's opinions
are worthy of note in that he chairs the Senate judiciary subcommittee studying
the bankruptcy laws. Id.
public exposure to asbestos should not enable the corporation to
wash its hands of the matter.
Considerations of "fairness" appear on both sides of the ques-
tion. While an argument can be made to the effect that "fairness"
demands compensation be paid to those injured as a result of the
Manville Corporation's "outrageous conduct," an argument may
also be advanced that "fairness" suggests the industry should not
bear the full brunt of litigation; the United States government
should also take its share of responsiblity. What seems dubious
is Manville's use of the bankruptcy laws both to seek relief from
litigation and to force Congress to act. The fact that the Manville
Corporation was solvent when it filed for Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion only serves to emphasize this point.
Nevertheless, the language of the Bankruptcy Code is drafted
so as to allow the filing of a "solvent" debtor for Chapter 11 reor-
ganization. Bankruptcy Code section 109(d) provides merely that
a person who qualifies as a debtor under Chapter 7 may be a
debtor under Chapter 11. Any person or entity may be a Chapter
7 debtor who is not a railroad, an insurance firm, or a banking
firm.183 There is no requirement, either in the Code or in the ac-
companying legislative history, that such a debtor be insolvent.
This lenient standard also serves to protect creditors by encourag-
ing debtors to file for reorganization at a time when more of the
debtor's assets are still available to satisfy creditors' claims.
While only an "honest debtor" is to be given a wholly fresh
start, the Supreme Court and the bankruptcy courts have been
reluctant to deny the debtor relief absent express legislative di-
rection. Only where Congress has expressed its intention to deny
a wholly fresh start has the Court denied a debtor escape from
his creditors. If solvent debtors are to be denied bankruptcy re-
lief, it seems likely that such denial must come from Congress.
Furthermore, Congress has expressly provided that only "will-
ful and malicious" torts are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. This
suggests that the "honest debtor" may include debtors whose acts
have been negligent or even in "reckless disregard of the rights of
others." The Manville Corporation's debts have arisen as a result
of its adjudicated negligent and reckless acts and will likely be
discharged. Given this express provision of Congress, the filing
by the Manville Corporation for reorganization was not an
"abuse" of law as it now reads.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (Supp. V 1981).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Presently, it seems doubtful that bankruptcy courts will inter-
pret "willful and malicious" injury to include "reckless disregard"
in light of reasonably clear legislative intent. This being the case,
the tangle created by the Manville bankruptcy will leave the
larger issue of compensation for asbestos victims ultimately in
the hands of Congress. The danger of "punitive damages overkill"
suggests that the courts have not efficiently resolved this national
health crisis. Indeed, there is serious question as to whether
courts, which essentially remedy wrongs against individual asbes-
tos victims, are equipped to fashion an efficient remedy for a na-
tionwide ill. Given the extent of asbestos exposure and the
present quagmire of punitive damages application, the Manville
bankruptcy was foreseeable. Only Congress is equipped to fash-
ion a nationwide remedy, and regardless of who ultimately pays,
this crisis cries out for remedy.
MARK KUNKLER

